By Marco Teruggi on March 20, 2019, from Caracas
Talking about Venezuela, Donald Trump repeated in Washington the already classic “all options are on the table.” Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro was by his side and said “it was necessary to free Venezuela” but he also reaffirmed what we already knew, his refusal to send soldiers in case of a possible military intervention.
That same day in Rome U.S. special representative on Venezuela, Elliott Abrams, reiterated that “all options are on the table.” “We say the US has chosen the path of exerting diplomatic and economic pressure on the regime for Venezuela’s peaceful future,” he added. Abrams said his statements after a meeting with Russian vice minister of foreign affairs, Serguei Riabkov, where, as was expected, there was no agreement between the two parties.
Diplomatic and economic pressure heated up on Monday and Tuesday. First there were illegal actions to occupy three diplomatic offices in the United States – in Washington and New York while at the same time Panamanian President Juan Carlos Varela was welcoming Juan Guaido’s envoy, whom he recognized as ambassador and accepted her credentials.
With regards to the economy, yesterday the US Treasury Department sanctioned Venezuela’s Minerven state gold mining company, nationalized in 2011. Such sanctions ban any US citizen or company from doing business with Minerven. This is how Abrams fulfilled his March 12th threat when he warned that the US was preparing “new and important sanctions against Venezuela.”
This new aggression is part of the series of attacks made against Venezuela that have caused the loss of $114 billion, according to researcher Pascualina Curcio. Of this amount, $21.4 billion were lost due to unilateral coercive measures such as financial blockades, commercial embargoes and the stealing of assets belonging to Citgo Petroleum Corp announced by John Bolton last January. The remaining $ 92.8 billion are the result of reductions of productivity tied to attacks on the currency and its impact on inflation and domestic production.
Together with Bolsonaro, Trump affirmed that there will be “harder sanctions” and called again on, “members of the Venezuelan army to stop supporting Maduro, who is really nothing more than a Cuban puppet”.
“All options” for now has meant strengthening attacks on the Venezuelan economy, creating a parallel government built in Washington, media demonization with the coordination of the corporate media, the attempt to enter Venezuelan territory on February 23rd, paramilitary attacks on barracks of the Venezuela’s Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB), sabotage of the country’s power grid that led to a nationwide blackout for over 72 hours. What other options could he be talking about? Those who lead the coup attempt in Venezuela, the ones appointed by Donald Trump, are trying to answer that question.
Three elements have not been met so far which could have changed the course of events: a rupture inside the FANB; a popular uprising induced by economic hardships and acts of sabotage; and mass support for Guiado among different social classes. The so-called “end of usurpation” seems unfeasible without those variables.
This means that in order to achieve the goal of overthrowing the President they need to carry out different actions and options, together with those that are currently and permanently underway and which will continue, especially those aimed at the economy and causing ruptures in the FANB. This is where the war hypothesis comes in. An armed element which might take different shapes.
They may consider a combination of armed groups which sabotage the oil industry so as to weaken production, an attempt to destabilize a particular territory like the state of Tachira, bordering Colombia, or the oil producing state of Zulia. There are different possibilities, as well as actors: criminal groups, paramilitary structures imported from Colombia and private mercenary forces previously trained in the Middle East.
These would be “inorganic” options, that is to say, led by the U.S. though not recognized openly as such. The option of an all-out intervention seems less probable right now due to lack of agreement within the U.S. and in the region. It’s also unlikely that a continental coalition could come together. Such a burden would fall mostly on Colombia, taking into account Bolsonaro’s statements which confirmed the known refusal of Brazil’s Armed Forces.
One possibility is that the end of this month could be used to exhaust all the actions offered by Guaido, who promised to travel across the country and return to Caracas with a national march. If he does not achieve greater support or national unrest, then the above analyzed situation could be started. That would occur if the U.S. planners maintain their decision of speeding up the attack to corner or overthrow President Maduro. The other option, which seems to be supported by the U.S. congressional democrats, for example, is to not go beyond the economic attacks and diplomatic/communicational isolation. In that case, the current scenario would go on for some time with the aforementioned variables.
https://www.pagina12.com.ar/182118-ee-uu-presiona-sobre-venezuela
Source: Pagina 12. Translation Resumen Latinoamericano, North America bureau